It is worth noting the implications of this distinction between liberty and normative reasons for prenatal diagnosis and embryo transfer. It is often stated that genetic counselling should be non-directive. Draper and Chadwick ask whether the same principles will apply to preimplantation diagnosis and embryo transfer. 2 In prenatal diagnosis, parents might be told that they have a fetus with Down's syndrome but left to decide for themselves whether to terminate. This does not imply that an embryo with Down's syndrome has the same value as one with a normal karyotype. Nor does it imply that doctors should transfer an embryo with Down's syndrome in preference to a normal embryo. Transfer of embryos requires that doctors act. This requires that they make a normative judgment about the rightness of that act, which has a different significance for what they should do compared to In health care in general, the importance given to personal liberty and autonomy might provide reasons justifying some degree of submaximisation. In reproduction, any claim on medical assistance has to do with reproductive rights (rather than liberties). It is far from clear how much assistance individuals are entitled to claim. Moreover, it is far from clear that parents also have "a right" to an option which results in the birth of a child with less prospect of a rewarding life.
Political statement That said, submaximisation in reproduction might be justifiable for other reasons. Burley and Harris discuss mixed-race marriages. Imagine that a black man and a white woman are infertile and have IVF with donor gametes. They want an embryo which will result in a black child. Because they live in a racist society, their child's life will be harder than that of a white child. But they want to make a political statement about racial equality. They want to make a statement of the equal value of people from different races. This is a good reason to have a black child. And in so far as that child's life would be worth living, there can be no objection on the child's part to having been brought into existence. Any white child they might have had would have been a different child.
Draper and Chadwick question whether parents should be entitled to bring into existence a child with Down's syndrome to effect a political statement, when they could have a normal child. Whether the parents are so entitled turns on whether there is a good reason to make that statement. While there is no difference in value between the lives of people from different races, there is a difference in the value of the life of a person with mental retardation compared to the life of a child of normal intelligence. Race does not necessarily contract the richness of our relationships and our lives in the way mental retardation does. Mental retardation narrows our engagement with the world, puts greater limits on what we can achieve and the richness of our relationships with family and friends, and restricts the degree to which we can live our own life. We have a reason to prefer normal embryos to embryos with conditions which result in mental retardation, in a way that we do not have a reason to prefer embryos from a particular race. To the extent that any political statement asserts that we have as much reason to bring into existence someone with severe mental retardation as someone with a normal intelligence, it does not provide a good reason for action. This does not preclude parents from having a child with mental retardation for other reasons, such as improving family welfare by increasing financial support or improving the plight of other retarded children in society, which might appeal to a principle of equal consideration of the suffering of all existing individuals. Provided the child's own life would be worth living, these reasons might justify parents' preferences for a retarded child.
Reasons may be relative to an individual's circumstances. Imagine a woman wants a girl rather than a boy. She is also a carrier of the adrenoleukodystrophy gene.5 Assume that any affected male will die as a child. Unaffected males will be completely normal. Female carriers will carry a gene, which may be passed on to their children, and they have a ten per cent chance of becoming paralysed in middle age. Preimplantation diagnosis shows that the embryos are: one affected male, two unaffected males and two female carriers. She wants a female carrier transferred. Her reason is that she was sexually abused as a child. She suffers great psychological anxiety when she sees or handles male genitalia. This might provide a good reason to transfer a female carrier rather than an unaffected male, even though the offspring might be paralysed in middle age.
Should doctors clone? If cloning results in a person who has a worse life than a non-cloned individual, medicine's commitment to maximisation raises the question: why should doctors clone? If A will be worse off than B, there must be some other good reason for choosing A besides welfare considerations, if we want to say that doctors should bring A rather than B into existence. If, for example, the clone had some exceptional talent that meant that its life would go very well in one direction, while it might suffer in other directions, this might provide a reason to clone. Van Gogh led a short life marked by mental and physical suffering. It is unclear exactly what mental illness he was intermittently suffering from, and for how long he suffered. Some say that he had periods of severe depression followed by periods of mania accompanied by hallucinations. Others have proposed that he was suffering from epilepsy, paranoid schizophrenia, alcoholism or syphilis.6
He led a life punctuated by depression and anguish, often for prolonged periods of time, cul-minating in his suicide at the age of 37. He also lived in great poverty. During his lifetime he sold only one painting. He was never recognised in his own lifetime to be the genius he was. Among his last words were: "But what's the use?"7 Van Gogh was also one of history's greatest painters. He achieved more in six years of painting (and most of his work was produced in three years) than probably any other painter in a similar time.
Van Gogh's life went very well from the perspective of producing great art, but it went badly in other respects. Although Van Gogh's life contained great suffering, his talent and contribution to the lives of others provides a reason to clone him, if he requested it. (But for you and I, there are unlikely to be such reasons to support reproductive cloning.)
Cloning could also be used to promote political values, such as equality. In a society with a gross gender imbalance, cloning a particular sex to redress this gender imbalance would provide a reason to clone.
Should doctors be influenced by reasons for action which go beyond the welfare of the individual concerned? Should they be influenced by the welfare of others or political values? Perhaps, in health care in general, individuals should not be harmed to promote these other goals. We should not take the organs from one person without that person's consent to benefit several other people. But when no individual is harmed by promoting these other values, there is less reason to object to taking them into consideration. Imagine that A, the clone, will be worse off than B, the non-clone, because A will be the object of excessive attention. If A is not harmed by being brought into existence rather than B, that is, A's life is worth living (and, A cannot regret being brought into existence, despite having less than perfect prospects), then why not consider these other values?
Is genetic relatedness a good reason to do less than the best? The issue of whether doctors should offer services which bring about a worse outcome than could be achieved is not new. A couple who both had cystic fibrosis recently requested in vitro fertilisation (IVF) to have a child of their own. They were awaiting lung transplants and were likely to die before the child reached adulthood. Apart from the risk of pregnancy to the mother, the husband would require testicular biopsy to procure sperm. The anaesthetic required presented grave risks to his health, according to his doctors. Intracytoplasmic sperm injection would also be necessary.
Because both parents had cystic fibrosis, the child would be certain to have that disease. The couple refused to consider using donor sperm. Artificial insemination (AID) would have reduced the risks to the mother of superovulation, eliminated the need for an anaesthetic for the father and would virtually eliminate the risk of the child being affected by cystic fibrosis. It was the superior option: all that IVF had in its favour was that it would provide the couple with a child which was genetically related to them. Should doctors provide IVF rather than AID to this couple?
The major reason why parents like this want to have a child who is going to be worse off than some other child which they could have is because they value genetic relatedness, as Draper Are you and I special? Or are we rather ordinary people for whom feelings of preciousness about the value of our own genes are likely to be more difficult to justify? If most of us share a similar range of talents, dispositions, and traits, then there is little reason to believe our children will be better than most. If our genetically related children will suffer some disease, perhaps we should have genetically unrelated children without these diseases.
Reproductive liberty
Is this eugenics? Yes, it is. But not all eugenic practices are objectionable. Killing a fetus with Down's syndrome is eugenics and widely accepted. Wikler has reviewed what is objectionable about eugenics.9 What is most objectionable is when the reproductive liberty of people is infringed to promote a perceived good. But we are concerned with putative reproductive rights, rather than liberties here. Unless we believe that people have not only a right to a child, but a right to a child of their own, then not offering them medical assistance to have a child of their own is not an infringement of their rights. This is quite different from the objectionable eugenic practices which occurred in Nazi Germany, America and Europe where people were deemed unfit to reproduce and were sterilised or killed by the state.
We have only been considering choices between different possible children, for example, whether to implant this normal embryo or that embryo with Fragile X (Same Number Choices). More complex issues arise when we consider the choice between having a disabled and no child (Different Number Choices). I will not address Different Number Choices. Doctors have a duty to bring into existence the child who will have the longest and best quality life in Same Number Choices, unless there is a good reason not to. For David King,'" maximisation is itself an objectionable form of eugenics. In the absence of a good reason not to maximise, submaximisation is irrational and arguably immoral.
What about the claim that most of us are genetically unique and that is reason enough to have a child of our own?" It is hard to see the value of genetic uniqueness when that particular uniqueness is not associated with something of value. All rocks are of a unique shape (no two are identical) but that is hardly a reason to get excited about every rock. Diversity and uniqueness for no other reason seems to be of little value.
These claims regarding the overvaluing of genetic relatedness are based on the assumption that parents will come to care about a child who is genetically unrelated to them. Parents have a good reason to save the lives of their own children, rather than other people's children, even if those other children will have longer and happier lives. That is because parents care about their own children to a much greater degree, and that care is based on a special relationship their own children have to them. But there is no such relationship between parents and potential children, genetically related or unrelated.
In a similar way, genetic relatedness may be important in so far as people will suffer depression if they do not have children who are genetically related to them. However, I doubt whether the magnitude of this depression will be so great. Many adoptive parents seem happy enough. Though some may wish that they had had their own genetically related children, they do not seem to suffer serious depression or regret.
On this argument, parents should not be provided with assisted reproduction (cloning or IVF) when the outcome will be a child seriously affected by a genetic disease, such as Fragile X, and a child with better prospects could be produced. In Draper and Chadwick's example of Simon and Claire, doctors should not provide assisted reproduction when the outcome is likely to be a child afflicted with mental retardation, when donor gametes could be used.
According Genetic relatedness may have some instrumental value. Perhaps beliefs about its value are strongly culturally, religiously, or evolutionarily determined and difficult to change. Perhaps they are the source of pleasure and pride in genetic parents. And this may be enough to tip the scales in favour of my own child rather than Einstein's clone.
But there are limits to this instrumental value. Like beliefs about genetic relatedness, beliefs about the value of men compared to women are strongly culturally and religiously determined in some societies. Parents may derive much more pleasure from the birth of a boy rather than a girl in countries such as India and China. The pleasure that parents derive from having the child of their preference is a reason for them to have that child. Interestingly, many liberals are opposed to doctors offering sex selection, even if parents want it, it gives them pleasure and ministers to some cultural value. However, even if we accept sex selection in some circumstances, doctors should not bring into existence a severely disabled male child in preference to a normal female. And so, doctors should not bring a very disabled or sick child into existence when they could bring a child into existence expected to have a long and rewarding life. Whatever the value of genetic relatedness, it is not an unconditional value. Producing an offspring which is genetically related is not itself a good reason to clone.
Conclusion
In the future, genetics will offer us much more information on the nature of embryos and fetuses, and perhaps even gametes. In the case of cloning, we will have more information than ever before on the disease susceptibilities, talents and personality traits of the future individual. Such information will allow us to make fine-grained distinctions about the value of the individuals which would result. We may be able to say that this embryo is likely to have a better life than that. If medicine has an absolute commitment to maximisation, doctors should only offer to bring into existence those individuals who are expected (based on the information available) to have the best lives. I don't believe that medicine has such a commitment to maximisation. I believe that doctors can intentionally bring about an outcome which is less than the best-but only if there is good reason to do so. Mere genetic relatedness is not, I believe, a good reason for action. An upshot of these arguments is that there may be a more widespread role for using donor gametes in clinical genetics as a way of avoiding genetic disease, at least until gene therapy comes of age.
